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Sectarianism and Ideology in the Saudi-Iranian Relationship

As noted in Chapter One, the conventional narrative of Saudi-Iranian relations suggests that heightened Sunni-Shi’a tensions throughout the Middle East should be a significant factor in the policy calculus of each regime. Ideologies that emphasize the distinctions between Arabs and Persians, the East and the West, and ruling classes and the “street” are also thought to inform Saudi and Iranian threat perceptions. While these structural elements certainly affect relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, they are not the main drivers. Rather, sectarianism and ideology function both as calculated instruments of state policy and as a set of deeply held beliefs by certain key constituencies that decisionmakers must factor into their policy calculus.

We begin by outlining the background of Saudi-Iranian relations to understand how each regime has traditionally viewed its place in the regional order and shaped its policies accordingly.

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We then examine Iran’s “Arab street” strategy as an ideological component of its foreign policy that has had the effect of indirectly undercutting the al-Saud and, more broadly, Sunni Arab regimes in the Middle East. This tactic reached its height with the July 2006 war in Lebanon, which provoked debate inside the Kingdom and a flurry of anti-Iranian and anti-Shi’a invective from Saudi clerical figures. The following two sections examine the consequences of this sectarian response for Saudi Arabia’s Shi’a population and Iran’s Sunni population.

Finally, we address how the two states have recently sought to dampen sectarian tensions.
For U.S. policymakers, understanding the religious and ideological sources of confrontation and cooperation is critical to managing the Saudi-Iranian relationship and mitigating instability throughout the region. A policy that either knowingly or inadvertently attaches too much weight to these sectarian and ideological factors-in effect conflating the symbolic vocabulary of the bilateral relationship with its substance-could actually provoke greater tensions and potential conflict.

Post-Saddam Relations Unfold Against a Turbulent Backdrop

Saudi-Iranian relations are unfolding today against the backdrop of a post-1979 ebb and flow of ideological contention and pragmatic rap-prochement.1 Understanding this fluctuation is important for discerning the variable drivers for bilateral relations: Perceptions of U.S. policy, leadership changes and domestic factionalism, and regional conflict all combine to exert influence. As noted by a Gulf commentator, relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran are frequently the result of the “echo of (regional) changes, rather than an expression of national interests.”2 Analyzing the pre-1979 period also yields fruitful insights into how each state, irrespective of the complexion of its regime, views its place in the regional order.

Under the Shah during the 1960s, the two states shared mutual security concerns about the anti-monarchist and pan-Arab platform of Egyptian president Gamal Abd al-Nasser. There was no contention over religious leadership, and Riyadh and Tehran managed their relationship without significant turmoil, particularly after the 1968 announcement of the departure of British forces from the Gulf.3 The tenor of their dealings was nonetheless strained over the issue of regional hierarchy, OPEC leadership, and a multilateral approach to Gulf security. As noted by Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, the fundamental obstacle during this period-and one that continues to contribute to today’s tribulations-was Saudi Arabia’s “unwillingness to be a junior partner in the local system, and its inability to be an equal partner.”4

The 1979 Revolution in Iran, however, exacerbated these geostrategic differences by injecting into Iran’s policy behavior a revolutionary ideology that was anti-monarchical, universalist, and anti-imperial. For rulers in Riyadh, the fall of the Shah and the rise of Khomeini was a veritable earthquake, threatening the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia by appealing to its disenfranchised Shi’a population in the Eastern Province, unsettling the al-Saud’s confidence about the reliability of support from the United States, challenging their claim to Islamic leadership, and imparting a new vocabulary of resistance to Islamists across the region, regardless of their sectarian hue.5

The most palpable manifestation of the new threat inside Saudi Arabia was the siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by followers of Juhayman al-Utaybi in 1979, followed shortly thereafter by a Shi’a intifada (uprising) in the Eastern Province.6 Less visibly and more long- term, the Iranian Revolution placed intense pressure on the al-Saud from their own religious bureaucracy by providing a model of government that accorded primacy to the clerical class and cast a spotlight on the perceived impiety of the Saudi royal family.7 Among certain members of the al-Saud, the fall of the Shah was also an indirect indictment of recent Saudi reforms under King Faysal, demonstrating the potentially violent response of an Islamicized society that had been subjected to too rapid and too sweeping a modernization.8

From the point of view of Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was a godsend: a chance to reaffirm its Islamic legitimacy in the face of challenges by Khomeini, both to international audiences and to domestic constituents.9 As noted by Vali Nasr in his testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the resulting ideological rivalry between the two states “served as the context for radicalization that ultimately led to 9/11.”10 Aside from subsidizing the recruitment, travel, and training of foreign jihadist volunteers to Afghanistan, Riyadh sponsored the production of an expansive array of anti-Shi’a and anti-Iranian tracts, designed to highlight the narrowly ethnic and sectarian aspirations of the Khomeinist regime and mitigate its more universal appeal throughout the region and the world.11 As discussed further below, many of these publications have enjoyed renewed currency within jihadist and radical Salafi circles today.12

For its part, Iran sought to extend its influence both near and far, by offering safe haven and varying degrees of support to dissident Shi’a groups such as the Organization for the Islamic Revolution on the Arabian Peninsula (OIR), the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB), the Hizb-e Wahdat in Afghanistan, the Da’awa Party in Iraq, various Hizballah groups in Kuwait and the Gulf, and of course the Lebanese Hizballah.13 However, several of the Gulf groups had more local, indigenous roots among Shi’a clerical currents in Kuwait and Iraq rather than in Qom; their philosophical inspiration from the Islamic Revolution did not necessarily entail political obedience to Tehran’s ambitions.14

The annual Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca provided another highly sensitive and symbolic arena for Tehran to rattle the al-Saud by inciting Iranian pilgrims toward revolutionary activism and rhetoric. Recurring tensions reached their apex in 1987 when over 450 Iranian pilgrims were killed by Saudi security forces, with the result that the two countries totally severed their diplomatic relations for three years.15 Today, some Saudi analysts point to the Hajj as a vulnerable arena for Iranian retaliation against the Kingdom, particularly in the circumstances of a U.S. attack on Iran.16

Aside from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the other, more important conflict that profoundly affected Saudi-Iranian relations was Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 1980. The status and orientation of Iraq has always been an important determinant of the Gulf geometry of power and especially so for Riyadh and Tehran; a weak Iraq can arguably be said to increase rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, whereas a strong Iraq can stabilize or moderate the tensions.17 Iran viewed the unprovoked attack by Saddam Hussein as having been undertaken partially in the service of Saudi interests to eradicate the Revolution. Saudi Arabia supported Iraq as a buffer against Iran. Yet it was the war’s impact on changes in the regional order that further strained relations.

The war provided the context for the massive introduction of U.S. military aid and forces into the region, largely at Riyadh’s invitation, which in Tehran’s view fatally tipped the local balance of power to its disadvantage. The establishment of U.S. Central Command under the Carter Doctrine, the sale of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to Saudi Arabia in 1980-1981, and the creation of the GCC in 1981 were all viewed in Tehran as net gains for Saudi Arabia. In 1984, the effect of American military assistance to Riyadh was palpably felt by Tehran when Saudi aircraft, using U.S.-supplied AWACS information, shot down two Iranian planes that had reportedly violated Saudi airspace.

The Iran-Iraq cease-fire in 1988 apparently vindicated the Saudi policy of using Iraq as a local buffer against Iran, while in Tehran, the war’s termination spawned an intense reevaluation of Iranian Gulf policy that became gradually less antagonistic. The death of Khomeini and the subsequent struggle between the more pragmatic president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and the Supreme Leader successor, Ali Khamenei, showed how Iran’s factionalized political system and dispersed decisionmaking structure can contribute to tension and confusion in the Saudi-Iranian bilateral relationship. At various times since 1979, Riyadh has found it difficult to discern coherence in Iranian policy amidst the cacophony of competing voices.18

In both states, the impetus for a gradual warming of relations throughout the 1990s stemmed from a number of domestic and regional factors.19 Understanding these is important for separating the structural sources of tension that divide the two states from the more fluid and dynamic variables.

The 1990 invasion of Kuwait highlighted Saddam’s Iraq as a shared threat to both countries, and Tehran’s lack of support to the Shi’a intifada in 1991 in southern Iraq sent the first signal to Riyadh that the era of revolutionary expansion may have ended. The subsequent postwar domestic crisis in Saudi Arabia-marked by unemployment hovering at 12 percent, a concerted Islamist challenge to the royal family due to the stationing of U.S. troops on Saudi soil, and a dispute over succession-strengthened the argument for rapprochement among key segments of the royal family.20 By the end of 1991 the two countries had restored diplomatic relations with the historic visit of Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faysal to Tehran.

It is important to note, however, that despite the increasingly high levels of diplomatic meetings and joint communications that characterized the early 1990s, fundamental tensions between the two states continued to be played out in a number of important theaters. Most notably, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the new republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia created a new zone of political, economic, and cultural contestation. Aside from ensuring that the independence of these states did not inspire similar breakaway impulses among its own ethnic populations, Tehran was keen to expand its influence in Central Asia as compensation for the influence it had lost in the Gulf.21

For its part, Saudi Arabia indirectly supported the United States’ efforts to counter Iranian influence by backing Turkey’s appeal to pan-Turkism in the region. But Riyadh also saw the area as ripe for the spread of Salafism among the predominately Sunni populations of the Central Asian republics as a means to “out-Islamicize” Tehran’s similar efforts.22 Tajikistan offers an illustrative example of how Saudi Arabia effectively bested Iran’s efforts; Tajiks proved largely tone-deaf to Iran’s zealous promotion of their shared Persian heritage and language ties, while Riyadh’s massive investment in religious infrastructure and media met with a more receptive audience.23 For Saudi Arabia, the Tajik episode demonstrated an important feature of future bilateral contention with Tehran-the importance of simply outspending the Iranians in the cultural and media sphere.

Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops was another contested arena; Iran and its allied Hazara groups were sidelined from Saudi-and U.S.-sponsored Afghan power-sharing accords in 1992 and 1993.24 Iran was also surprisingly slow to appreciate the threat from the Saudi-backed Taliban, and it was only after the fall of Kabul in 1996 and Mazar-e Sharif in 1998 that Iranian aid to the anti-Taliban alliance gathered steam.25

Aside from Central Asia, tensions continued to play out elsewhere on the Arabian Peninsula during the early 1990s. Much of this stemmed from Tehran’s increasing concern about the presence of U.S. forces in the region as a barrier to a more localized security and economic system in which Iran would be the dominant player.26 During a 1992 border incident between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Iran evinced open support for Qatar’s position and offered the tiny kingdom a defense treaty and a supply of 30,000 troops.27 In 1994, Iran lambasted Saudi Arabia’s support for secessionist south Yemen during the Yemeni civil war as an oblique attack on the GCC policy more generally, which has traditionally sought to weaken Yemen. In 1996, Bahrain’s al-Khalifa government, longtime clients of the al-Saud, announced the capture of coup plotters who had reportedly been trained by the Lebanese Hizballah and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The same year also saw the bombing of the U.S. Air Force barracks at Khobar Towers in Dharan, Saudi Arabia, purportedly by members of an Iranian- trained Saudi Hizballah cell.28 None of these provocations actually advanced Iran’s position, but rather caused increased confusion and suspicion in Riyadh.29

The ascendancy of Crown Prince Abdullah in 1995 gave the push toward détente new momentum. Abdullah enjoyed comparatively greater legitimacy among domestic Islamists than his predecessor, King Fahd, and thus felt more empowered to pursue regional initiatives. He reportedly saw value in bolstering Rafsanjani’s pragmatic outreach, fearing that Iran could fall back to the hardliners if the new president were not supported. This prerogative culminated in a historic meeting between the two leaders on the sidelines of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Pakistan in 1997. There, Abdullah reportedly assured Iran that the presence of U.S. troops in the region to contain Iran was inadvisable in the long term and gave his unequivocal support to Iran’s presidency in the OIC. In return, Rafsanjani agreed to ensure that Iranian pilgrims would not incite disturbances during the Hajj.30 Finally, Saudi Arabia’s refusal to implicate Iran as the state sponsor for the bombing of the U.S. Air Force barracks at Khobar Towers has been interpreted by some observers as an additional gesture of goodwill; as recently as 2007, Saudi diplomats told RAND researchers that Iran “owes” Riyadh for this gesture.31

The latter half of the 1990s, particularly under the “Good Neighbor” policy of Iranian President Mohammed Khatami, saw a strengthening of the groundwork for détente that Rafsanjani had laid, but with a significant shift in tone. Khatami’s breakthrough policy was to effectively “compartmentalize” Iran’s insistence on the departure of U.S. forces from the region from its efforts to build good relations with the Gulf states, despite their dependence on American support.32 Defense Minister Vice Admiral Ali Shamkhani, himself an ethnic Arab, emerged as the new administration’s principal point man for this charm offensive; his fluency in Arabic reportedly served to reinforce Tehran’s commitment to improving relations and helped build personal rapport with a number of Gulf leaders.33 The warming culminated in the historic visit of the Iranian president to Jeddah in 1999, followed by a number of regional and security agreements in 2001 and 2002 covering terrorism, money laundering, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration.

Following September 11th and the collapse of the Taliban, the two states increasingly coordinated on countering al-Qaeda. In the months preceding the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Riyadh and Tehran issued joint declarations opposing any U.S. invasion, fearing a potential spillover of post-Saddam disintegration.34 But Iraq’s subsequent descent into internal strife, the influx of foreign fighters, the political ascendancy of Iran’s Shi’a allies, and Tehran’s growing influence more broadly all conspired to overturn the previous push for rapprochement.

The election of President Ahmadinejad in 2005 accelerated this trend by imparting a triumphalist, nationalistic, and excessively strident tone to Iranian policy, which contrasted sharply with the conciliatory efforts of the Khatami administration. This shift in tone provides the backdrop for understanding the current dynamics that shape relations between the two countries.

Iran’s “Arab Street” Strategy Provokes Dissent Inside Saudi Arabia

Speaking to RAND researchers at a roundtable meeting in 2007, a Saudi scholar noted that, were it not for Iran’s incitement, “Sunnis and Shi’as in the Middle East would live as brothers.” “Sectarianism is a major part of Iran’s foreign policy,” noted another observer.35 Yet the record of Iranian and Saudi behavior since the fall of Saddam suggests just the opposite.

Since the invasion of Iraq and in particular since the election of Ahmadinejad, Iran has pursued what can best be described as an aggressively nonsectarian, “Arab street” strategy that appeals to Arab publics by emphasizing Iran’s commitment to the Palestinian cause, opposition to Western imperialism in the region, and resistance to U.S. pressure on the nuclear issue.36 As noted by an official in the Lebanese Hizballah’s research wing,

At the heart of Iran’s foreign policy are two key issues: the Palestinian cause and confronting Washington’s hegemonic schemes in the region. There is nothing particularly Shia about the two issues. Indeed, both have been presented as causes for the majority of Sunni Arabs. In this sense, Iran’s foreign policy is Sunni (italics added).37

Popular Saudi columnist Mshari al-Dhaydi appeared to echo this interpretation, urging his readers in al-Sharq al-Awsat in July 2007, to

examine all the big Arab portfolios-Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq. They are being stolen from Arab hands … and turned over to Iranian hands gradually.38

Yet Iran’s hyperactivism on pan-Arab issues is not necessarily proof of its influence, but rather just the opposite-an effort to overcompensate for its fundamental isolation from the rest of region. Despite its claims to universalism, it remains the odd man out.39 By its own admission, it has largely failed in its attempt to refashion the Arab world in its image, reflected most visibly by the fact that Gulf Shi’a groups that received Iranian endorsement (the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, the Organization for the Islamic Revolution on the Arabian Peninsula, and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) have all distanced themselves from their erstwhile patron and its revolutionary ideals, through name changes or a more substantial reorientation of goals.

Nonetheless, Iran’s belief, whether warranted or not, that it can draw support from Arab publics has impelled Tehran toward brinkmanship and bravado in its policy toward Saudi Arabia. This is nowhere as evident as on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

The Israeli-Palestinian Issue Is a Key Component of Iran’s “Arab Street” Strategy

In the Saudi-Iran relationship, the Israeli-Palestinian issue appears to have acquired significant ideological sensitivity. Supreme Leader Khamenei termed Palestine as “a limb of our body” at the height of the Palestinian intifada in 2000.40 Iran matches its rhetoric with increasing financial support to Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), making it such a major player in Gaza that an Egyptian ex-foreign ministry official lamented to RAND in 2008, “The Iranians used to come to us and talk about Palestine and we would say, ‘who . . . are you to tell us about Palestine.’ Now when they come, we have to listen.”41

The seizure of pan-Arab issues by Iran has thus inspired alarm, but also a degree of jealousy in Riyadh, which has long prided itself on Arab leadership on the Israeli-Palestinian issue-especially in light of Egypt’s retreat from the regional stage since the Camp David Accords. Saudi officials appear particularly incensed that Iran can win over Palestinian loyalties, and especially loyalty from Hamas, while Riyadh’s mediation efforts have been fruitless.42

Rhetorically, Iranian officials have presented themselves as paragons of virtue on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, often with the calculated intent of embarrassing Saudi Arabia. An example of this dynamic was Ahmadinejad’s speech denying the Holocaust in the presence of King Abdullah at a 2005 summit in Mecca. The Iranian president’s remarks were a brazen act of one-upsmanship that left the al-Saud mortified and unable to respond.43 There continues to be disdain for Iran’s involvement in Palestinian affairs, with Saudi diplomats telling RAND researchers in March 2007 that this “is an Arab issue, so why is Iran involved?”44

Iran’s Support for Hizballah in 2006 Was a Turning Point

It was the actions of Iran’s principal Levantine ally, Hizballah, during the summer 2006 that presented the most powerful pan-Arab trump card to the al-Saud. A Shi’a organization backed by Saudi Arabia’s strategic rival had effectively bested the vaunted Israeli Defense Forces, galvanizing Arab opinion and undercutting Sunni Arab regimes who had long evinced opposition to Israel, but with little to show for it. The debate over whether to lend moral and rhetorical support to Hizballah exposed the fundamental paradox between the al-Saud’s broader aspirations to pan-Arab leadership and the more insular doctrinal aversion to Shiism of its Salafi clerical establishment.

It is critical to emphasize that, like the 1979 Revolution, the event was “read” by various domestic actors in Saudi Arabia through different lenses: Tose with a more vested interest in the system and the rule of the al-Saud decried Hizballah for provoking an Israeli attack, sowing fitna (discord), and pursuing narrowly sectarian goals. Tose farther out from the Saudi circle of power, particularly semi-official clerics from the Sahwa or “awakened” current, seized upon the war to highlight the caution, immobility, impiety, and-in some cases- illegitimacy of the Saudi regime.45 Even farther from the Salafi center, there were sporadic demonstrations by Shi’a communities in the Eastern Province in solidarity with Hizballah and, indirectly, with Iran. Yet these were likely motivated by the same sentiment that spawned similar demonstrations in Cairo, Amman, and elsewhere-applause for Hizballah and Iran for challenging Israel and shaking up the stagnant political order, rather than any expressions of sectarian affinity.

Regardless of whether they demonstrated, Shi’as in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia during this period were subjected to growing pressures, both from the regime, which feared them as a potential fifth column for Iran, and from hard-line Salafi clerics, whose anti-Shi’a pronouncements against Hizballah had a reverberating “echo effect” on these communities. As will be discussed at length in the next section, our discussions in the Eastern Province in March 2007 revealed the lingering effect of the war: increased harassment by Salafi hardliners from the Najd, arrests, censorship, and the restriction of cultural and religious freedoms. Taken in sum, the war placed incredible stress on the Saudi regime, exposing fissures and tensions from multiple quarters.

Irrespective of whether the summer 2006 war was launched at Iran’s suggestion, Tehran emerged from the conflict with the upper hand in the bilateral relationship-at least in terms of Arab public opinion.46 From Qom and Mashhad, Iranian clerics attacked Saudi Arabia’s official clerics (derided as “court ulema”) as being increasingly out of touch with the sentiment of the Saudi populace and Arab publics, who were largely supportive of Hizballah.47 In postwar polling in Egypt, Ahmadinejad came in second after Nasrallah as the most important leader in the region. From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, a particularly galling aspect of the war was a reported spike in Sunni conversions to Shiism in Syria, Egypt, and even in the Sudan.48 Here again, the phenomena was less an expression of sectarian affinity and more a signal of political solidarity with the “winning sect,” which seemed to be ascendant in Iraq and was the only regional power capable of challenging Israel. The trend appears to have grown worrisome enough that King Abdullah took the rare step of issuing a public warning that regionwide efforts at Shi’a proselytizing would fail.49 Although not named, Iran’s support was implied.

Trough the actions of its Lebanese ally Hizballah, Iran prompted a barrage of anti-Shi’a invective by the Saudi clerical establishment as a rearguard action against the “regime-versus-public” fissures that the Hizballah war had exposed. This sectarian offensive by Saudi voices intensified in the wake of subsequent U.S. deliberations about a withdrawal from Iraq. The vocabulary and parameters of this discourse-as well as its local effect on the status of Gulf Shi’as and, more broadly, bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran-will be covered next.

Anti-Shiism in Saudi Arabia: Manifestations and Effects

As noted earlier, the 1980s saw a flurry of anti-Shi’a publications by the Saudi clerical establishment designed to blunt the ideological appeal of the Iranian Revolution.50 Many of these texts today have been resurrected and enjoy a newfound resonance among certain Sunni audiences in the context of the fall of Saddam Hussein and the growing perception of Shi’a ascendancy across the region.

It is important first to characterize the extent of the Saudi regime’s official relationship to anti-Shi’a discourse. Several analysts have described the policy as one of willful neglect or tacit endorsement, but not necessarily explicit promotion.51 Official Saudi voices emphasize that it is Iran’s policy behavior and regional ambitions, not Shiism per se, that fuels their concern. Domestically, King Abdullah starting in 2003 held a series of well-publicized and high-level National Dialogue sessions that focused on recognizing and bridging the gap with the internal “other”-fostering dialogue among Sufis, Salafis, Shi’as, and other sects within Saudi Arabia. For a state that has traditionally eschewed any acknowledgement of internal religious plurality, this was a remarkable development.

Yet in discussions with RAND researchers, Saudi reformists and Shi’a clerics suggested that the National Dialogue sessions had no effect on the Salafi establishment; one reformer termed the meetings “hollow debating societies.”52 By the end of 2006, the regime was doing little to rescind or counter the anti-Shi’a fatawa that were being issued by popular Salafi clerics. The shrillest and most damaging of these occurred at the height of Saudi uncertainty about a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and fears of Iran potentially filling the power vacuum.

In the official Saudi press, there was widespread speculation about a secret deal between the United States and Iran, and Prince Turki al-Faysal publicly warned the United States not to withdraw. In October 2006, Saudi officials met with Harith al-Dhari, leader of the Association of Muslim Scholars, potentially signaling their drift toward a more activist role.53 On December 10, 38 Saudi clerics joined Iraqi clerics in signing a statement denouncing the killing and displacement of Iraqi Sunnis at the hands of Shi’as and said, “we should openly side with our Sunni brothers in Iraq and lend them all appropriate forms of support.” The signatories included noted Sahwa shaykhs Safar bin Abd al-Rahman al-Hawali and Nasr al-Umar.54 Other clerics soon followed suit.55

All of this occurred in a more generalized climate of anti-Iranian seething that followed the execution of Saddam Hussein, which, because of its occurrence on the last night of Ramadan and the taunting of the ex-president by prison guards allied with Muqtada al-Sadr, was characterized in many Arab press outlets as having been orchestrated by Iran with U.S. connivance.56 In Iran, the fatawa elicited a firm rebuke from clerics and officials.

In the context of growing tensions with Iran over Iraq, particularly since 2006, Saudi Arabia’s anti-Shi’a rhetoric can be considered partly a calculated political action rather than solely a symptom of a deeper sectarian divide between the two states. Faced with pressure from their clerical establishment, yet cognizant of anti-Shiism’s mobilizing potential, Saudi leaders released the pressure valve on this ideology at a critical juncture.

Saudi-Iranian Thensions Have Slowed Pro-Shi’a Reforms

This strategy, however, had little deterrent effect on Iran or its Shi’a allies. The real impact was felt among Saudi Arabia’s own Shi’as and their efforts to secure increased civil and political liberties. In the Eastern Province, our interviews suggest that the deterioration of Saudi-Iranian relations and the resulting anti-Shi’a vitriol from Salafi clerics were having a chilling effect on the regime’s previous reforms toward its Shi’a citizens. Some of our interlocutors framed the problem as one of willful negligence; despite King Abdullah’s overtures to the Shi’as at a national level, the regime has consistently pursued what one interviewee termed a “shut-eye policy” on anti-Shi’a abuse at the local level- tolerating or not cracking down sufficiently on instances of discrimina-tion.57 The official channels for reform were increasingly seen as a ploy to keep the Shi’as engaged and “talking,” rather than “acting.”

Another important by-product of Saudi-Iran tensions has been the fraying of reform cooperation among Sunni and Shi’a activists inside Saudi Arabia. In discussions with RAND researchers, Sunni liberals in Jeddah pointed to growing distrust between Sunni reformists and their Shi’a counterparts in the Eastern Province. Much of this is due to the “echo effect” of the wars in Lebanon and Iraq: Saudi Sunnis interpret Shi’a support for Sadr and Hizballah as an expression of a “winner take all” mentality that allows no cooperation across sectarian lines. For their part, Shi’a reformists believe that some of their Sunni allies are “closet Wahhabis.”

Saudi-Iranian tensions have also highlighted the issue of whether Saudi Shi’as are loyal to the Kingdom or to external maraja‘ al-taqlid- literally, “sources of emulation” (singular, marja‘ al-taqlid)-venerated senior clerics who exert influence over Shi’a social, cultural and, particularly in the case of Iran, political affairs. Since these figures reside in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon, the institution has fueled Saudi Salafi accusations that the Shi’as are acting as a fifth column for Iran. Our interviews suggest that the most popular of these figures by far is Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, based in Najaf; according to some interlocutors, 70-80 percent of Saudi Shi’as follow his guidance. Yet during discussions with RAND researchers, Shi’a contacts downplayed al-Sistani’s role in Saudi affairs, emphasizing their loyalty to the royal family. Moreover, our interlocutors asserted that other major maraja‘, such as Sayyid Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah and Ayatollah Mohammed Hadi al-Mudarassi, are careful to avoid speaking specifically about Saudi Shi’a affairs; instead, they restrict their pronouncements to the Shi’as as a whole, to avoid giving the impression of meddling in Saudi Arabia’s domestic politics.58

Seeking to bolster their nationalist bona fides, some Shi’a intellectuals have pushed for a Saudi-based hawza (seminary) for training Shi’a clerics, especially for creating an indigenous, Saudi marja‘-what one contact referred to as an ibn al-mintaqa or “son of the region.” In their view, this would expedite the national integration of Shi’as and remove any basis for accusing them of loyalty to foreign authority.59 It should be noted, however, that this initiative does not enjoy universal support among Shi’a activists; more secular, leftist figures argue that reducing the power of the maraja’ should itself be a first step in reforming the sect of Shiism, before any national integration can be accomplished.

One of these critics is the Shi’a intellectual Tawfiq al-Sayf, whose book Nathiriyyat al-Sulta fi Fiqh al-Shi’i [Theories of Political Power in Shi’a Jurisprudence] criticizes the politicization of the Shi’a clergy, singling out Iran’s vilayet-e faqih (rule of the supreme jurisconsult; the ideological foundation of the Iranian regime) for special attention.60

Despite these explicit intellectual attacks on Iranian ideology, our interviews with Saudi Shi’as did reveal a degree of empathy for Iran. Yet these sentiments are best characterized as spiritual and emotional affinity for Iran as a Shi’a state, rather than admiration for its political ideology or regime. Many acknowledged the dire state of the Iranian economy and the authoritarian character of the regime. One Shi’a contact argued that the Saudi regime’s decision to allow Saudi Shi’as to travel to Iran was a master stroke of genius, effectively deflating any possible utopian reverence for Iran. Many Shi’as who went returned with a new appreciation for Saudi Arabia, despite its flaws.

Moreover, some Saudi Shi’a writers and activists have emerged as major voices of anti-Iranian, anti-Khomeinist scholarship, whose resonance extends well beyond the Arabian Peninsula. The aforementioned Tawfiq al-Sayf is one prominent example; aside from his own scholarship, he authored a translation of the work of a major Iranian-born cleric, Shaykh Mohammed Hussein Na’ini.61 Na’ini’s book Tanbih al-umma wa-tanzih al-milla [Admonishing the Community of Believers and Cleansing the Sect] critiques the Shi’a precept of waiting for the Hidden Imam, which underpins the legitimacy of clerical rule in Iran. Al-Sayf believes it has also hindered Shi’a efforts at national integration in Saudi Arabia.

Political supporters of Iran in the predominately Shi’a Eastern Province have not fared well. There are reportedly pockets of Iranian sympathy in Qatif, Dammam, Awamiyya, and Safwa. A key pro-Iranian cleric, Hassan al-Nimr, appears to have shed his previous affiliation with Saudi Hizballah and is focused on political activism and sectarian reconciliation. In a meeting with RAND researchers, he remained an unapologetic defender of vilayet-e faqih, arguing that even Sunni clerics have endorsed this idea, albeit under a different name. Yet in the 2005 municipal council elections, al-Nimr’s faction failed to gain a single seat.

Fifth Column Fears Exist at an Unofficial Level, but Are Overblown

As noted earlier, the Iranian Revolution injected a more political dimension to anti-Shi’a Salafi doctrine by raising the specter of Saudi and Gulf Shi’as acting in the service of Tehran. Today, fears of Iran and uncertainty over the future power structure in Iraq have inspired similar distrust of Saudi Shi’as, if not by the Saudi regime then by voices in the militant Salafi milieu. An important marker in the rising preeminence of anti-Shiism as a feature of radical Salafi discourse is the proliferation of Salafi Web sites explicitly devoted to anti-Shiism. Many frequently cite anti-Shi’a rhetoric drawn from the pantheon of Wahhabi-Salafi ideologues, including Mohammed Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Ibn Taymiyya, Abd al-Aziz Bin Baz, Mohammad Surur Zayn al-Abidin, and Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi. Aside from theological sources, material on the Web sites is often drawn from Western and Arab press as well as Western think-tank publications translated into Arabic. In these sites and chat rooms, Salafi writers-including such luminaries as the Syrian cleric Abu Basir al-Tartusi and Saudi Arabia’s most vitriolic opponent of the Shi’as, Nasr al-‘Umar-as well as anonymous chat room posters have envisioned a geography of sectarian conflict that includes not just Saudi Arabia but the entire Middle East, where embattled enclaves of Sunnis confront a growing Shi’a-Iranian menace.62

Aside from fearing Shi’a mobilization in the Eastern Province, some Saudi observers believe that Iran could exploit other internal fissures. Saudi Arabia is complex mosaic of local and sectarian identities, bound together by a homogenizing narrative of monarchical state formation that, since the 1920s, has been imposed by force, tribal intermarriage, oil subsidies, school curricula, national celebrations, and other cultural practices. Much of this narrative accords primacy to the Najdi heartland, to the detriment of other local and provincial identities.63 In our interviews in Jeddah and in the east, reformists and activists emphasized this regional hegemony by the center by coining the Arabic term tanjid (literally, “to make something Najdi”).64

With the fear of internecine strife in Iraq and the rise of Iran, the solidity of this state-building narrative has been subjected to some scrutiny and doubt. Web sites advancing the autonomy of the eastern provinces of Qatif and al-Ahsa, as well as the southwest area of Asir, have recently appeared.65 Speaking with RAND researchers in March 2007, Saudi analysts in Jedda and Riyadh warned that Iran could seek to exploit these internal fissures by promoting an increased sense of local identity through its transnational media outlets.66

Yet overall, the threat of Saudi Shi’as being used as retaliatory agents by Tehran appears overblown. Our Saudi Shi’a contacts, as well as government security sources in Riyadh and Jeddah, do not expect widespread protests, only limited acts of sabotage if the United States were to attack Iran over its alleged nuclear weapons program. First and foremost, Saudi Shi’as remember the aftermath of the 1979 Shi’a uprising in Qatif, which resulted in a severe curtailment of civic freedoms and the virtual militarization of the Eastern Province. They are therefore fearful of taking any actions that could give the regime a pretext for rolling back freedoms they have secured over the past two decades (even if these liberties are incomplete). Others pointed to the extensive Saudi intelligence penetration of the Eastern Province and Sunni villages interspersed among Shi’as as mitigating any serious disruptions.67

Iran Also Fears Saudi Incitement of Its Minorities

Perhaps to a greater extent than Saudi Arabia, Iran also fears internal fragmentation through outside incitement. Only 51 percent of Iran’s 65 million people are ethnic Persians, with ethnic Kurds, Azeris, Arabs, Baluch, and other groups forming a complex demographic mosaic throughout the country’s provinces. Much has been made of Iran’s ethnic fissures, yet the regime has proven surprisingly adept at co-opting ethnic minorities from the periphery into the center. As noted above, Former Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani is an ethnic Arab (on several occasions, he was dispatched by the Khatami administration to Khuzestan to allay Arab fears of marginalization), and the Supreme Leader ‘Ali Khamenei himself is an Azeri.

Nonetheless, Iran has long feared agitation by its own Sunni and Arab populations. In light of growing tensions with the United States, fears of American and British support to ethnic Baluch separatists, Arab activists in Khuzestan, and Kurdish dissidents have grown more acute, and Iran has at times accused Saudi Arabia of supporting this effort among Arabs and Sunni Baluch.68 Saudi analysts told RAND researchers in March 2007 that the presence of aggrieved minorities in Iran “could be useful leverage to the Kingdom. But so far we haven’t exploited this.”69

In the southwest province of Khuzestan, Iranian regime figures appear to perceive a sort of division of labor between Britain, which they believe supplies lethal aid to ethnic Arab dissidents, and Saudi Arabia, which is thought to spread Salafi doctrine to subvert Iranians’ religious outlook.70 Thensions are also evident in eastern Iran, where the combination of weak administrative control by the government, drug smuggling, extremism, porous borders, and poverty have conspired to produce a low-grade insurgency by ethnic Baluch.71 Not surprisingly, Saudi Arabia is frequently fingered as an external influence, given its widespread humanitarian and economic investment in the area, often in concert with Pakistan.72

In sum, manifestations of anti-Shi’a sentiments have risen since 2006, certainly among Saudi clerics and to a limited extent on the margins of the Saudi regime. Although this is certainly a religious issue for clerics, in a larger sense it reflects Saudi fears about the power vacuum that is opening up in Iraq. Tus it is more a political instrument than a religious difference, and its ultimate victims are Saudi Shi’as. For its part, Tehran has been hypersensitive about external meddling among its own ethnic and religious groups and probably attributes more omnipotence in this sphere to Saudi Arabia than is warranted.

Notes

  1. For an Iranian view of relations, see Hamid Hadyan, “Exploring Iran-Saudi Relations in Light of New Regional Conditions,” Rahbord (Tehran), translated by Open Source Center, IAP20061113336001, 16 May 2006.
  2. Hassan Hanizadeh, “Iran, Saudi Arabia Open a New Chapter in Regional Cooperation,” The Tehran Times , 14 June 2008.
  3. For relations during this period, see Faisal bin Salman, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf: Power Politics in Transition, London: I. B. Tauris, 2003.
  4. Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, “Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order,” Adelphi Paper, Vol. 204, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 9.
  5. For an example of the Revolution’s impact on a Sunni Islamist movement, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, see Rudee Mathee, “The Egyptian Opposition on the Iranian Revolution,” in Juan R. I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie, Shi’ ism and Social Protest, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986. For more background on Saudi perceptions of the Iranian Revolution, see David E. Long, “The Impact of the Iranian Revolution on the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf States,” in John L. Esposito, The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact, Miami: Florida International Press, 1990, pp. 100-115.
  6. For the Shi’a uprising in the Eastern province, see Toby Craig Jones, “Rebellion on the Saudi Periphery: Modernity, Marginalization and the Shia Uprising of 1979,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 38, 2006.
  7. Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007b, p. 105.
  8. Chubin and Tripp (1996, pp. 9-10). See also Sa’ad Badib, Al-’Alaqat al-Saudiya al-Iraniya, 1932-1983 [Saudi-Iranian Relations, 1932-1983], London: The Center for Iranian-Arab Relations, 1994.
  9. The invasion also provided a figleaf to counter Iran’s accusation that Saudi support to Iraq was divisive and harmful to larger Islamic causes.
  10. Quoted in Beehner (2007).
  11. Madawi al-Rasheed has argued that by challenging the al-Saud’s claim to pan-Islamic legitimacy, the Iranian Revolution effectively “universalized” its Salafi discourse, which had thus far promoted jihad within the domestic context of the state’s foundation (al-Rasheed, 2007b, p. 105).
  12. One key example is the renewed popularity of an anti-Khomeinist book written shortly after the Revolution, purportedly by a prominent cleric at the Islamic University of Medina; the tract was quoted extensively by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in a four-hour diatribe recorded shortly before his death in June 2006. The book is by Mohammad Abdallah al-Gharib, believed by many analysts to be a pseudonym for Mohammad Surur Zayn al-Abidin, an influential Syrian-born cleric at the Islamic University of Medina. See Mohammad Abdallah al-Gharib, Wa Ja’a Dur al-Majus [And Then Came the Turn of the Magi], n.p., 1983; as well as the transcript of the audio recording by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, “Hal Ataka Hadith al-Rawafidh? [Has Word of the Rejectionists (Shi’as) Reached You?],” n.d.
  13. It should be noted that, during the 1990s, these Gulf-based groups abandoned their violent agenda and instead worked to promote change peaceably. For the transformation of the OIR into the Islah movement, see Foud Ibrahim, The Shi’is of Saudi Arabia, London, England: Dar al-Saqi, 2007. The IFLB became the Islamic Action Society (IAS). RAND interviews in al-Qatif, al-Dammam, March 2007, and Manama, November 2006.
  14. For background on the origin of Shi’a dissident movements in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain and their relationship with Iran, see Laurence Louër, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf, London, England: Hurst and Company, 2008.
  15. Chubin and Tripp (1996, p. 17).
  16. RAND interviews with Saudi analysts in Jeddah and Riyadh, March 2007.
  17. Chubin and Tripp (1996, p. 39).
  18. Chubin and Tripp (1996, p. 19).
  19. Gawdat Bahgat, “Iranian-Saudi Rapprochement. Prospects and Implications,” World Affairs, Vol. 162, No. 3, Winter 2000; Gwen Okruhlik, “Saudi Arabian-Iranian Relations: External Rapprochement and Internal Consolidation,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer 2003. Iranian commentators have more recently maintained that the tensions all along were the result of either Ba’athist propaganda or U.S. instigation. For example, a Tehran Times columnist in 2006 wrote that “foreign powers that were concerned about the establishment of solidarity among countries on the north and south of the Persian Gulf attempted to create division between Iran and members of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council” (Hanizadeh, 2008).
  20. Okruhlik (2003, p. 117).
  21. Henner Furtig, Iran’s Rivalry with Saudi Arabia Between the Gulf Wars, New York: Ithaca Press, 2006, p. 179.
  22. Furtig (2006, p. 195).
  23. Furtig (2006, p. 204).
  24. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000, p. 199. See also Mohsen Milani, “Iran’s Policy Toward Afghanistan,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 60, No. 2, Spring 2006.
  25. Rashid (2000, p. 203).
  26. Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic, New York: Times Books, 2007, p. 68.
  27. Chubin and Tripp (1996, p. 36).
  28. This is a subject of some debate: For example, the bombing has also been linked to al-Qaeda. For a persuasive argument refuting al-Qaeda’s involvement, see Tomas Hegghamer, “Deconstructing the Myth About al-Qa`ida and Khobar,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1, No. 3, February 2008, pp. 20-22.
  29. For a time line of Saudi-Iran relations, see Furtig (2006, pp. 249-263). At the level of ideology and media, Iran continued in the early 1990s to promote anti-Saud propaganda. An illustrative example is the journal Risalaat al-Haramayn, published from 1991 to 1995 in Beirut under Iranian sponsorship and affiliated with the Saudi Hizballah. The periodical played to a Saudi Shi’a audience, but also tried to exploit regional Hijazi resentment toward the Najd. See Ibrahim (2007, p. 195).
  30. Keynoush (2007, p. 157).
  31. RAND interview with Saudi diplomats in Riyadh, March 2007.
  32. Takeyh (2007, p. 68).
  33. Mohsen Milani, “Iran’s Gulf Policy: From Idealism and Confrontation to Pragmatism and Moderation,” in Jamal S. al-Suwaidi, Iran and the Gulf: A Search for Stability, Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1996; Kenneth R. Timmerman, “The Saudi-Iranian Taw,” The Wall Street Journal, 26 May 1999; Howard Schneider, “Saudi Pact with Iran is Sign of Growing Trust,” The Washington Post, 17 April 2001; Douglas Jehl “On Trip to Mend Ties, Iran’s President Meets Saudi Prince,” The New York Times, 17 May 1999.
  34. Keynoush (2007, pp. 183-193).
  35. RAND discussion with Saudi foreign ministry officials, Riyadh, March 2007.
  36. It is important to note that internally, President Ahmadinejad aggressively promoted aspects of Shi’a theology, particularly the concept of the Mahdaviat or return of the Hidden Twelfth Imam. This messianic posturing, along with Iran’s nuclear ambitions, certainly rattled Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, but it was not an explicitly sectarian strategy that tried to denigrate Sunnis. Indeed, Iran’s official pronouncements have tended to emphasize that the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and anti-Shi’a takfiris are aberrations from Islam. For more on the role of apocalyptic thought in Iran’s policy calculations under Ahmadinejad, see Mehdi Khalaji, “Apocalyptic Politics: On the Rationality of Iranian Policy,” Policy Focus, No. 79, Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2008.
  37. Hizballah think tank official Ali Fayyad, quoted in Abd al-Latif (2007).
  38. Mshari al-Dhaydi, “Uhadhir an Taqdhi Alihi al-Ama’im [I Warn the Religious Establishment],” al-Sharq al-Awsat, 19 July 2007.
  39. Joost Hiltermann has noted, “[Iran] wants to have the greatest influence possible, and it can only do that if it is not a sectarian actor … It can be more effective if it does not play the Shi’a card.” Quoted in Scott Peterson, “Saudi Arabia, Iran Target Mideast’s Sectarian Discord,” Christian Science Monitor, 5 March 2007.
  40. Shaul Shai, The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Therror, Piscataway, N.J.: Transaction Books, 2005, p. 149.
  41. RAND discussion with ex-Egyptian foreign ministry official, Cairo, Egypt, March 2008.
  42. See Karen Elliot House, “Saudi Balancing Act,” The Wall Street Journal, 4 April 2007.
  43. See Girard (2005).
  44. RAND interviews in Riyadh, March 2007.
  45. “Saudi Daily Views Heated Debate Between Clerics on Shi’a Treat, Hizballah,” a l -Watan (Abha), translated by Open Source Center, GMP2006092814005, 28 September 2006.
  46. A 2006 Zogby/University of Maryland poll following the 2006 Lebanon war asked 3,850 respondents in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to identify the two countries who posed the greatest threat to their security; only 11 percent identified Iran, contrasted with 85 percent who listed Israel and 72 percent who cited the United States. Among world leaders most admired by respondents, Hizballah leader Hasan Nasrallah came in first, while Ahmadinejad came in third, after French president Jacques Chirac (Zogby International, 2006). A separate poll by al-Arabiya in February 2007 revealed similar unease, extending to Iran’s ambitions throughout the Arab world. See Al-Arabiya, “Banorama: Kayf Yanthur al-Arab Iran? [Panorama: How Do Arabs View Iran?],” 26 February 2007. Domestically, however, the Arab trump card may have come at a price; there was anecdotal reporting of popular dissent inside Iran against the regime’s lavish support to Hizballah, especially given the dire state of the Iranian economy. See Azadeh Moaveni, “Why Iran Isn’t Cheering,” Time, 23 July 2006.
  47. Middle East Media Research Institute, “An Eternal Curse on the Muftis of the Saudi Court and on the Pharaoh of Egypt,” Jomhouri-ye Eslami, 28 July 2006.
  48. Ellen Knickmeyer, “In Syria, Converting for Sake of Politics: Hezbollah’s Gains During Lebanon War Inspire Sunnis to Become Shiis,” The Washington Post, 6 October 2006.
  49. Interview with King Abdullah, al-Siyasa (Kuwait) January 27, 2007.
  50. For historical overviews, see Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay, North Haledon, N.J.: Islamic Publications International, 2002; Hala Fattah, “‘Wahhabi’ Influences, Salafi
    Responses: Shaikh Mahmud Shukri and the Iraqi Salafi Movement, 1745-1930,” Journal of Islamic Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2003, pp. 127-148; and Mohammad Rasul, Al-Wahhabiyyun wa al-’Iraq [The Wahhabis and Iraq], Beirut: Riad el-Rayyes Books, 2005.
  51. Jones (2007) has written, “Unlike in the 1980s, when Saudi Arabia met the ideological threat posed by Khomeini head-on, the kingdom’s rulers have not consistently manipulated sectarian hostility.” Yet he later concludes that “managing and strategically deploying anti-Shiism is nevertheless an important part of [King Abdullah]’s government’s political calculus.” Gause (2007a) has argued for a similar ambivalence in Saudi policy, noting that “the Saudi government itself has not played the sectarian card in recent crises” but still frames it as a form of “cynical manipulation” and likens it to “playing with fire.”
  52. RAND interview with a Sunni reformist, Jeddah, March 2007.
  53. Abdullah Shihri, “Clerics Urge Muslims to Back Iraq Sunnis,” Associated Press, 12 December 2006.
  54. The text of the fatwa is available at the Web site of Saudi cleric Nasr al-Umar (Nasr al-Umar, homepage, no date).
  55. For others, see “Shaykh Salman al-Awda Warns of Sectarian War in Iraq, Holds the US Responsible,” Islam Today, translated by Open Source Center, GMP20061107866002, 5 November 2006.
  56. Gause (2007a). The Saddam execution and Iran’s conduct in Iraq more generally have the effect of negating whatever goodwill and support it has engendered in Arab opinion because of its support to Palestinian groups and Hizballah. Less than six months after the July 2006 war, available polling and media surveys revealed a noticeable drop in Arab public support for Iran-stemming principally from worsening sectarian violence in Iraq. Zogby’s February-March 2007 survey showed that a majority of respondents believed Iran’s role in Iraq was unhelpful. In an interview with RAND in Amman in February 2008, a Jordanian analyst noted that there were “two Irans” in Arab opinion: a good one (for supporting Palestinians) and a bad one (for perpetuating crimes against Iraq’s Sunnis).
  57. Frederic M. Wehrey, “Saudi Arabia: Shi’a Pessimistic on Reform, But Seek Reconciliation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Arab Reform Bulletin, June 2007; “Saudi Authorities Close Down Shi’ite Mosque in al-Ihsa Governorate” (al-Rasid report by Mohammad Ali in al-Munayzilah headed: “Security authorities close mosque in village of al-Munayzilah”), translated by Open Source Center, GMP20061003866002, 2 October 2006; “Saudi Arabia: Report on Arrests in Eastern Region for Sympathizing with Hizballah” (Unattributed report from Qatif: “In al-Qatif, a number of sons of the region arrested), translated by Open Source Center, GMP2006101866001, 15 October 2006.
  58. For more on the issue of political involvement by external marja’, see Shaykh Hassan al-Saffar, “La wa Lan Nuqbil Aya’ Marja’n Ta kfiri’an wa Arfad Tadkhal aya’ Marja’ fi al-Shu’un al-Siyasiya al-Dakhiliya li-Biladna [We Do Not and I Will Not Welcome Any Marja’ (Spiritual Reference) Tat Promotes Ta k fi r (Excommunication) and I Oppose the Interference of Any Marja’ in the Internal Political Affairs of Our Country],” al-Risala, 16 February 2007.
  59. RAND interviews with Shi’a activists in Qatif, March 2007. See also, Saud Salah al-Sarhan, “Nahwa Marja’iyya Shi’a Mustaqlila fi al-Khalij [Toward an Independent Shi’a Source of Emulation],” al-Sharq al-Awsat, 24 February 2003.v
  60. Shaykh Tawfiq al-Sayf, Nathiriyat al-Sulta fi al-Fiqh al-Shi’i [Theories of Political Power in Shiite Jurisprudence], Beirut: Center for Arabic Culture, 2002.
  61. Based in Najaf, Mohammad Hussein Na’ini (1860-1936) taught Ayatollah Abu’l-Qassim Khu’i, who was the mentor of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani.
  62. Major anti-Shi’a Salafi Web sites include albainah.net, wylsh.com, and khomainy.com.
  63. For more on this construction of national identity, see al-Jazeera, “al-Kharita al-Madh-habiya fi al-Sa’udiya [The Sectarian Map in Saudi Arabia],” 6 June 2003; al-Rasheed (2007b). Aside from Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province Shi’as, who are mostly Twelver (Ithna’Ashar) Shi’as, there are Shi’as in Medina (the so-called Nakhawala) and also in the southern province of Najran (the Isma’ilis).
  64. RAND interviews in Jeddah and Qatif, Saudi Arabia, March 2007. For an argument emphasizing the Kingdom as more homogenous in identity-especially in light of the chaos of the Iraq war-see Bernard Haykel’s post to the “Middle East Strategy at Harvard” blog (”Saudis United,” blog post, Middle East Strategy at Harvard, 16 December 2007).
  65. See the Web site, Dawlat al-Ahsa wa al-Qatif (homepage, no date), which appears to promote militancy and regional autonomy for the eastern region, even arguing for union with Basra. Similarly, the Web site of the “Free State of Asir” has argued for secession of the southwest province, albeit in a peaceful manner (Free State of Asir, homepage, no date).
  66. RAND interviews in Jeddah and Riyadh with Saudi activists and analysts, March 2007.
  67. RAND interviews in Qatif, Damman, and al-Ahsa, March 2007.
  68. Among the significant ethnic groups, Azeris constitute 24 percent of the population, Kurds 7 percent, Arabs 3 percent, and Baluch 2 percent. For more on ethnic dissent in Iran, see John R. Bradley, “Iran’s Ethnic Tinderbox,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 1, Winter 2006-2007, pp. 181-190). RAND interview with a European scholar of Iran, October 2007.
  69. RAND interviews with Saudi former government officials and analysts, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, March 2007.
  70. “Commentary Details Iran-Saudi Religious, Political Clash in Iraq,” Persian Press, Rahbord (Tehran), ), IAP20061113336001, 16 May 2006 [Commentary by Hamid Hadyan: "Exploring Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations in Light of New Regional Conditions"]; “Iranian Daily: Theologians Concerned by Reported Sunni Preaching in Khuzestan,” Aftab-e Yazd (Tehran), translated by Open Source Center, IAP20051221011046, 20 December 2005; “Saudi Wahhabis Reportedly Funding Wahhabi Communities in Iran,” Persian Press, [Report citing Jahan News Agency: "Wahhabis investing heavily in southern Iran"], Hezbollah (Tehran), translated by Open Source Center, IAP20071007011005, 2 October 2007.
  71. For more on the insurgency, see Alex Vatanka, “The Making of an Insurgency in Iran’s Baluchestan Province,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 June 2006.
  72. RAND interviews with analysts and officials in Dubai, UAE, February 2006, and with Saudi analysts, Riyadh, March 2007.

Source: RAND Corporation, “Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for U.S. Policy, 2009

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