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Sectarianism and Ideology in the Saudi-Iranian Relationship »

Saudi Arabia and Iran-Between Confrontation and Cooperation

The fall of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the war in Iraq have affected sweeping changes to the strategic landscape of the Middle East, radically shifting the regional balance of power. Old security paradigms have been thrown into question, and local states appear to be reaffirming, renegotiating, or rethinking their relations with one another and with outside powers. Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran have arguably been a central pivot around which this transformation has turned. The collapse of Iraq as the eastern flank of the Arab world and growing regional perceptions of U.S. immobility have encouraged Tehran’s ambitions for regional preeminence, amplified its existing influence, and provoked a Sunni Arab diplomatic counterreaction, spearheaded to a large degree by Saudi Arabia and tacitly endorsed by Washington.1 The dynamic relations between the two powers are unfolding in the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, with important implications for regional stability and U.S. interests.2


Deep Bilateral Thensions Affect Regional Stability and U.S. Interests

Long-standing structural tensions would appear to characterize much of the relationship between these oil-rich powers, each possessing aspirations for Islamic leadership and differing visions of regional order. Tehran continues to regard Riyadh as America’s principal local proxy and a buffer against Iran taking what it feels is its rightful place as the region’s preeminent power.3 From its perspective, Saudi Arabia harbors a deep-seated distrust of Iran, stemming from the 1979 Revolution and its explicit call for overturning the Sunni monarchical order. Yet even before this ideological challenge, Riyadh long perceived a stark asymmetry between its own national power and that of Iran, in terms of demography, industrial capacity, and military strength. The recent growth of Iranian influence in Shi’a-dominated Iraq and Tehran’s nuclear aspirations are seen in Riyadh as catastrophically upsetting the balance-of-power equation that had favored Saudi Arabia for more than 20 years.4 More distantly, the prospect of Iranian-U.S. rapprochement (or even near-term coordination on Iraq) would appear to jeopardize the privileged position Riyadh has long enjoyed in Gulf affairs.5

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The regimes in Riyadh and Tehran are buttressed by disparate political ideologies: Governance in Saudi Arabia rests on a careful symbiosis with the clerical establishment, but accords ultimate authority to the al-Saud dynasty based on their claim to custodianship of the Islamic holy sites in Mecca and Medina and their genealogical ties to the founder of the Kingdom, Ibn Saud. Iran’s Khomeinist ideology is vehemently anti-monarchical, formalizes clerical authority in politics and-especially under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad-trumpets an explicitly populist line.6 Iran has also rattled Saudi Arabia and other Arab states through its “Arab street” strategy of speaking directly over the heads of Arab rulers to their publics, undermining the rulers’ legitimacy by portraying them as sclerotic lackeys of Washington, and upstaging them on the Palestinian question through provocative rhetoric and support to such groups as Hamas and Hizballah.7

Economically, the two states have differing agendas at the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that stem from their disparate economic needs and demography. Saudi Arabia has the largest proven reserves in the world and is a major supplier to the Far East, the United States, and the rest of the world. It is therefore more willing to take a long-term view of the oil market. Iran, with its lower oil reserves and larger population, shows far less concern over the long-term oil market and faces more dire immediate requirements than Saudi Arabia.8

Taken in sum, these factors-along with the well-known sectarian and ethnic fissures that divide the two states’ populations-have generated concern among U.S. policymakers and security analysts. Regional and Western commentators have warned of a Saudi-Iranian “proxy” conflict engulfing the region or a return to the ideological “Cold War” that marked the bilateral relationship after the 1979 Revo-lution.9 Many observers have already interpreted outbreaks of regional instability as being incited, or even orchestrated, by these two powers seeking to outmaneuver one another-in Iraq, Gaza, and Lebanon.

Conventional Thinking About Saudi-Iranian Relations Must Be Reexamined

U.S. policy thus far appears to be focused not on mitigating the sources of these bilateral tensions, but rather on seeking to use Saudi Arabia as an “Arab balancer” against Iran. This view is encouraged by the idea that the Sunni-Shi’a divide naturally places the Arab states of the Persian Gulf on one side of the equation and Iran on the other. Yet relations between the two powers are complex and multidimensional, and a number of assumptions deserve to be reexamined, particularly regarding the confrontational nature of their policies and the sectarian component.

First, the presumption of a watertight bloc of “moderate Arab states,” led by Saudi Arabia, sponsored by the United States, and acting in lockstep against Iranian influence should not be taken as an accurate representation of facts on the ground.10 It is true that Sunni Arab fears of Iran have at times strengthened regional support for Saudi Arabia’s activism in the region. Yet the specter of Iranian influence and Saudi Arabia’s resulting assertiveness has also intensified long-standing inter-Arab debates between the Gulf and the Levant and within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) about regional hierarchy, sovereignty, and the degree of accommodation that is permissible with Tehran. For the smaller Gulf states and for Egypt, Riyadh’s new activism may be equally as alarming as the threat from Iran itself.11

Secondly, Saudi Arabia’s region-wide strategy toward Iran appears to be more nuanced than a simple “blocking” action; it incorporates elements of rollback, containment, and engagement that are playing out simultaneously in a number of subregions in the Middle East. When necessary, the two states have also shown the propensity for pragmatic cooperation in specific geographic areas and on issues where their interests intersect-even if in other areas there is concurrently open rivalry. Such calculations often take place independently of U.S. pressure or encouragement. As discussed further in this report, Saudi-Iranian efforts to mediate sectarian tensions in Lebanon following the 2006 Lebanon war provide the best illustration of this cooperation and showcase the way the two states attempt to lend themselves an aura of indispensability to local actors.12 Yet Hizballah’s move into West Beirut in the spring of 2008 also demonstrates how local dynamics can quickly undermine the efforts of these regional powers.

Finally, sectarianism should not be overstated as a factor in the two countries’ policy calculus toward one another.13 The religious foundations of each regime’s legitimacy make it unsurprising that Sunni-Shi’a tensions are a factor in the relationship, and there is indeed sectarian partisanship among segments of the citizenry, particularly within the clerical establishment of each country.14 Yet official pronouncements are surprisingly calibrated and carefully worded on these issues. Saudi King Abdullah, for example, noted in an interview that Sunni-Shi’a tensions are a “matter of concern, not a matter of danger.”15 Iranian officials are also careful to avoid demonizing Sunni Arabs as a whole, focusing instead on anti-Shi’a Sunni extremists. As discussed further in this report, it is more in keeping with Iran’s ideological aims to emphasize the divide between the “Arab street” and the monarchy than divisions within Islam.

Political factionalism, on the other hand, is certainly a factor in the bilateral relationship; it sends mixed signals to the other side and complicates efforts at dialogue.16 Given the opacity of decision-making inside Iran and Saudi Arabia, it is difficult to accurately discern the policy views of different personalities and groups. Yet during key junctures since 2003, factional differences have risen to the fore. In Saudi Arabia, for example, two trends appear to have vied over Iran policy: a more hostile one embodied by Prince Bandar bin Sultan and a more conciliatory one advanced by King Abdullah. As the Kingdom’s national security advisor and ex-ambassador to the United States, Bandar reportedly coordinated closely with the U.S. administration on a more confrontational policy designed to build regional consensus against Iran. In late 2006, this effort provoked the resignation of Prince Turki al-Faysal, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, who, it is said, disagreed with Bandar’s approach in favor of greater diplomacy and engagement with Tehran. By March 2007, however, the factions appear to have coalesced behind King Abdullah’s more nuanced approach, which involved publicly distancing the Kingdom from U.S. policy, offering lukewarm support for the U.S.-sponsored GCC+2 (Egypt and Jordan) coalition against Iran, and simultaneously pursuing a more unilateral diplomacy in the Levant and the Gulf.17

All of these considerations suggest that U.S. policymakers should take a fresh look at the relationship between these pivotal players and how it might affect U.S. interests in the future.

This Study Helps Fill an Important Policy Gap

Few studies have attempted to grapple with the important shifts in Saudi-Iranian relations since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.18 There is a critical need for a policy-relevant approach that focuses on the sources of tension and cooperation between the two powers, and the implications of this dynamism for both regional stability and U.S. policy. Similarly, few treatments have canvassed the full range of policy levers-diplomatic, economic, media, cultural and religious, and military/ intelligence-related-that the two states wield in their bilateral relations. Understanding how these instruments are deployed for confrontation or collusion in various areas in the Middle East is critical for drawing broader implications for U.S. policy, particularly concerning Iran.

This report helps to fill this gap with a fresh assessment of Saudi-Iranian relations after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The methodology is grounded in a combination of primary sources and fieldwork. We pay special attention to indigenous media sources in the region, focusing in particular on how editorials from the state-sponsored press in Saudi Arabia and Iran offer clues about regime perceptions of sectarian strife and bilateral competition.

Aside from these text-based approaches, the study relies on field-work conducted in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan from 2006 to 2008. During this period, we captured a range of viewpoints from government officials, diplomats, military officers, and think tanks. Our analysis is also informed by views of Saudi-Iranian relations from non official actors in a number of countries: political oppositionists, religious figures, and journalists.

Taking these sources into account, our study unfolds in the following structure:

  • Chapter Two discusses sectarianism and ideology as sources of contention between Saudi Arabia and Iran. It analyzes the extent to which these divisions affect each state’s regional aspirations, threat perceptions, and behavior.
  • Chapter Tree explores Saudi-Iranian relations within the Gulf “Core” (the Gulf Arab states and Iraq) since 2003. Special attention is devoted to understanding how smaller Gulf states perceive their position in the context of Saudi-Iranian relations.
  • Chapter Four examines the implications of Saudi-Iranian relations for the Levant (particularly Lebanon and Palestine).
  • Chapter Five summarizes our findings and presents recommendations for U.S. policymakers.

Notes:

  1. For analysis of Iran’s influence and calculations in the region post-Iraq, see Robert Lowe and Claire Spencer, eds., Iran: Its Neighbors and the Regional Crises, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 2006; and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “Iran’s International Posture After the Fall of Baghdad,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 58, No. 2, Spring 2004. For the Saudi reaction, see Michael M. Slackman and Hassan M. Fattah, “In Public View, Saudis Counter Iran in Region,” The New York Times, 6 February 2007. For a brief overview, see Lionel Beehner, “Iran’s Saudi Counterweight,” Council on Foreign Relations, 16 March 2007.
  2. For an Iranian view of how this struggle is playing out, see “Ruyarui-e Iran va Arabestan dar khavar-e miane [Iran and Saudi Arabia Confrontation in the Middle East],” Aftab News, 5 December 2006.
  3. In the aftermath of revolution, Iranian officials went so far as to decry Wahhabism, the dominant form of Islam in Saudi Arabia, as “America’s Islam.”
  4. Interviews with Saudi government officials in Riyadh and Jeddah, 2006. See also F. Gregory Gause III, “Saudi Arabia: Iraq, Iran and the Regional Power Balance and the Sectarian Question,” Strategic Insights, February 2007a. Saudi preoccupation with Iraq achieved considerable notoriety with the publication of an op-ed by a semi-official analyst; see Nawaf Obaid, “Stepping into Iraq: Saudi Arabia Will Protect Sunnis If the U.S. Leaves,” The Washington Post, 26 November 2006b. The debate over Saudi intervention is covered in Megan Stack, “Hands Off or Not? Saudis Wring Theirs over Iraq,” The New York Times, 24 May 2006.
  5. Kirk Semple, “Sunni Leaders Say U.S.-Iran Talks Amount to Meddling,” The New York Times, 18 March 2006; Tariq al-Humayd, “Ala Matha Tufawad Washington Tehran? [What Will Washington Negotiate with Tehran?],” al-Sharq al-Awsat, 15 October 2007b; “Trilateral Talks Rattle Gulf States While Concealing Complex Iranian Dynamics,” Gulf States Newsletter, Vol. 31, No. 807, 8 June 2007.
  6. Saleh al-Mani, “The Ideological Dimension in Saudi-Iranian Relations,” in Jamal S. al-Suwaidi, Iran and the Gulf: A Search for Stability, Abu Dhabi, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1996, pp. 158-174.
  7. As noted by Olivier Roy in The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Belknap Press, 2001, p. 123), Iran’s Arab strategy is not reflective of its expansive influence but rather a symptom of its fundamental isolation. By being “more Arab than the Arabs,” Iran is trying to, as noted by Roy, “break out of the Shi’a ghetto.” See also Morten Valbjørn and André Bank, “Signs of a New Arab Cold War: The 2006 Lebanon War and the Sunni-Shi’i Divide,” Middle East Report, Spring 2007; Andrew England, “Arab Street Warms to Showman Ahmadi-Nejad,” Financial Times, 6 April 2007; Zogby International, “Middle East Opinion: Iran Fears Aren’t Hitting the Arab Street,” 2006; and Renud Girard, “The Calculated Provocations of the Islamist Iranian President,” Le Figaro (Paris), 19 December 2005.
  8. “OPEC Blunder Reveals Saudi-Iran Disagreement on Dollar,” Agence France-Presse, 17 November 2007.
  9. See Y. Mansharof, H. Varulkar, D. Lav, and Y. Carmon, “The Middle East on a Collision Course (4): Saudi/Sunni-Iranian/Shiite Conflict-Diplomacy and Proxy Wars,” Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Inquiry and Analysis Series, No. 324, 9 February 2007; and Iason Athanasiadis, “Sectarian Battles Spill Beyond Iraq; Sunnis, Shiites Eye Spoils for a Cold War Victory,” Washington Times, 13 December 2006. For the “spillover” from Iraq, see Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth Pollack, Tings Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War, Brookings Institution, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, January 2007. A less extreme view is found in Augustus Richard Norton, “The Shiite ‘Treat’ Revisited,” Current History, December 2007. Norton writes, “Reverberations from the 2003 invasion of Iraq may last for decades. But an inexorable spread of Sunni-Shi’a conflict is only the worse case, and frankly it is not very likely.” See also Joost Hiltermann, “Iraq and the New Sectarianism in the Middle East,” synopsis of a presentation at the Massachusetts Institute of Thechnology, 12 November 2006; Omayma Abd al-Latif, “The Shia-Sunni Divide: Myths and Reality,” Al-Ahram Weekly, 1-7 March 2007; and Toby Craig Jones, “Saudi Arabia’s Not So New Anti-Shi’ism,” Middle East Report, Vol. 242, Spring 2007, pp. 29-32).
  10. For Gulf Arab wariness of both the United States and Iran, see Neil Partrick, “Dire Straits for US Mideast Policy: The Gulf Arab States and US-Iran Relations,” Royal United Services Institute Commentary, 9 January 2008. For a discussion of recent Saudi and Gulf engagement of Iran, see Charles Kupchan and Ray Takeyh, “Iran Just Won’t Stay Isolated,” Los Angeles Times, 4 March 2008.
  11. For Egyptian fears of a possible Saudi-Iranian rapprochement and Egypt’s general loss of stature on pan-Arab affairs, see “Cairo Political Analysts View Implications of Iranian-Saudi Rapprochement,” al-Misr al-Yawm (Cairo), translated by Open Source Center, GMP20070309007003, 9 March 2007; and Khalid al-Dakhil, “al-Taakul al-Dawr al-Misri fi al-Mintaqa [The Erosion of the Egyptian Role in the Region],” al-Arabiya.net, 5 July 2006. For Arab and especially Saudi reactions to a possible Iranian nuclear capability, see Dalia Dassa Kaye and Frederic M. Wehrey, “A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbours,” Survival, Vol. 49, No. 2, Summer 2007.
  12. “Saudi Foreign Minister on Lebanon, Iraq, Sectarian Issues,” al-Arabiya Thelevision, Open Source Center Feature, FEA20070129084306, 25 January 2007; Michael Slackman, “Iran and Saudi Arabia Mediating in Lebanon Crisis,” International Herald Tribune, 30 January 2007a; Michael Slackman, “Iran and Saudi Arabia Mediate in Lebanon Crisis as U.S. Looks on,” The New York Times, 31 January 2007b.
  13. For seminal work on sectarianism as a feature of the new regional landscape, see Vali Nasr, The Shi’a Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future, New York: W.W. Norton, 2005; Yizhak Nakash, Reaching for Power: The Shi’a in the Modern Arab World, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006; Juan Cole, “A Shi’a Crescent? The Regional Impact of the Iraq War,” Current History, Vol. 105, No. 687, January 2006; and Jones (2007). Jones writes, “Unlike in the 1980s, when Saudi Arabia met the ideological threat posed by Khomeini head on, the kingdom’s rulers have not consistently manipulated sectarian hostility or consistently adopted a confrontational posture toward Iran, despite their clear desire to check or roll back Iranian influence.”
  14. In Saudi Arabia, the clerical establishment is the wellspring for much of this. In mid-2007, however, the Kingdom has taken tentative and perhaps temporary steps to curtail anti-Shi’a and pro-jihad fatawa (pronouncements); Iran’s Arabic-language TV station al-Alam took the remarkable step of applauding an anti-jihad fatwa by the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Abd al-Aziz al-Shaykh. See “Saudi Mufti Warns Against Joining Jihad Abroad,” Saudi Press Agency (Riyadh), translated by Open Source Center, GMP20071002825008, 1 October 2007.
  15. Interview with King Abdullah in al-Siyasa (Kuwait), January 27, 2008.
  16. For a discussion of the domestic drivers of Saudi foreign policy, see Gerd Nonneman, “Determinants and Patterns of Saudi Foreign Policy: ‘Omnibalancing’ and ‘Relative Autonomy’ in Multiple Environments,” in Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman, eds., Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs, New York: New York University Press, 2005, pp. 315-351.
  17. Hassan M. Fattah, “Bickering Saudis Struggle for an Answer to Iran’s Rising Influence in the Middle East,” The New York Times, 22 December 2006. Also, Marina Ottaway, “The New Arab Diplomacy: Not with the U.S. and Not Against the U.S.,” Carnegie Papers, Number 94, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2008.
  18. Exceptions include Gause (2007a) and Banafsheh Keynoush, The Iranian-Saudi Arabian Relationship: From Ideological Confrontation to Pragmatic Accommodation, doctoral dissertation at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Mass., 2007.

    19. Source: RAND Corporation, “Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for U.S. Policy, 2009.”

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    This entry was posted on Tuesday, October 6th, 2009 at 2:43 pm and is filed under Middle East Opinions. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.

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